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How  should  economists  compare  the  predictions  of  a model  with  the 
data?  A  currently  popular  answer  to  this perennial  question  is to plot  the 
impulse  response  functions  of  some  variables  to  shocks  and  compare 
the  responses  predicted  by  the  model  to  those  estimated  in the data.  This 
approach  is simple,  intuitive,  and  even  fairly  comprehensive,  since  im 
pulse  responses  contain  a great  deal  of  information.  For  a  linear  (or  lin 
earized)  model  with  constant  variances,  the  impulse  response  functions 
summarize  all  of  the model's  dynamics,  and  for  covariance-stationary 
data,  they  capture  all  of  the  second-order  properties  of  the data.  Impulse 
responses  have  allowed  economists  to move  from  focusing  solely  on 
variances  and  covariances  into  assessing  finer  features  like  persistence, 
sluggishness,  hump  shapes,  and  lead-lag  relations. 
In practice,  one  difficulty  with  this methodology  is how  to  estimate 
the  empirical  impulse  responses.  In  the  study  of monetary  policy,  re 
search  has  used  vector  autoregressions  (VARs)  and  this  is  the  recent 
growing  approach  in  the  study  of  fiscal  policy.  Perotti  gives  a  thorough 
and  insightful  survey  of  this work,  focusing  on  the  impulse  responses  of 
output,  hours,  consumption,  and  real wages  to  government  spending 
shocks.  These  have  led  to a debate  and  a challenge. 
The  debate  is between  Ramey  and  Shapiro  on  one  side  and  Blanchard 
and  Perotti  on  the  other.  All  agree  that  output  and  hours  rise  following 
an  exogenous  expansion  in government  spending,  but while  Ramey  and 
Shapiro  find  that  consumption  and  real wages  fall, Blanchard  and  Perotti 
find  that  they  rise.  Because  these  opposite  results  come  from  different 
empirical  strategies  to  identify  shocks  to government  spending?one  is 
narrative  and  uses  war  buildups  as  exogenous  dates,  and  the  other  is 
structural  and  assumes  government  spending  responds  with  a  lag  to 
other  shocks?this  has  led  to a  more  general  debate  on  the  relative  mer 228  Reis 
its of  these  two methods.  Furthermore,  Ramey  and  Shapiro's  results  are 
used  to support  the neoclassical  model,  while  Blanchard  and  Perotti's  are 
used  to  support  the Keynesian  model,  so  they  become  involved  in  the 
more  general  debate  of what  is the best  model  of  economic  fluctuations. 
The  challenge  is that  if Blanchard  and  Perotti  are  right,  it is hard?for 
two  reasons?to  understand  the  rise  in  consumption  following  the  in 
crease  in  government  spending.  First,  since  more 
government 
con 
sumption  uses  resources  and  lowers  private  wealth,  any model  with  a 
significant  role  for  the permanent-income  hypothesis  will  predict  a  fall 
in consumption.  Second,  since  with  standard  parameters  the marginal 
rate  of  substitution  between  leisure  and  consumption  rises  significantly 
with  the  increase  in hours  but  the wage  only  slightly  changes,  so  for 
households  to be  on  their  labor  supply  and  the  two  to be  equal,  con 
sumption  must  fall. One  answer  to  this  challenge  is, of  course,  the  old 
fashioned  IS-LM  model,  since  it violates  the  permanent-income  hy 
pothesis  and  has  hours  determined  by  labor  demand,  not  supply.  But 
more  modern  models,  whether  neoclassical  or 
neo-Keynesian,  whether 
real  or  monetary,  fail  the  challenge.  One  exception  is Gali,  Lopez 
Salido,  and  Valles's  (2007)  "truly  Keynesian"  model,  where  there  are 
not  only  pricing  frictions  but  also  a  large  group  of Keynesian  hand-to 
mouth  consumers  (who  consume  more  with  the  rise  in  income  coun 
teracting  the wealth  effect)  and  Keynesian  labor markets,  where  unions 
set  hours  and  wages  (so  these  are  determined  by  labor  demand,  not 
supply). 
In  this  comment,  I discuss  the use  of VAR  evidence  to  test models  via 
impulse  responses.  There  has  been  an  intense  debate  on  the merits  and 
flaws  of VARs  at  estimating  impulse  responses.1  Here,  I am  actually  go 
ing  to assume  that  Perotti's  estimates  are  exactly  right.  Instead,  I  will  fo 
cus  on  the use  of  these  estimates  to distinguish  between  models. 
1  An  Aside  into Monetary  Policy  and  Anticipated  Policy 
Before  I start,  it is  worthwhile  taking  a short  detour  into  the  literature  on 
monetary  policy  to make  an  observation  inspired  by  Cochrane  (1998). 
Imagine  that  three  researchers  estimated  the  response  of  output  and  a 
policy  variable  (say  an  interest  rate)  to an  exogenous  contraction  in pol 
icy. All  three  found  the  same  output  response,  in  the  left panel  of  figure 
3C1.1,  but  each  found  a different  response  of  the  policy  variable,  in  the 
right  panel  of  the  figure.  Would  they  reach  the  same  conclusion  if  they 
were  interested  in  testing  a  theory  of  output  fluctuations? Comment  229 
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Figure  3C1.1 
Fictional  Impulse  Responses  to Policy  Shock 
If  that  theory  stated  that  only  unanticipated  policy  matters,  as  in  the 
classical  models  of  Lucas  and  Barro,  the  answer  is yes.  All  three  esti 
mated  the  same  instantaneous  impact  on  the policy  variable,  and  that  is 
all  that matters  for output.  The  path  of policy  afterward  is anticipated  so 
it is neutral,  whether  it goes  up,  down,  or  stays  the  same. 
If, however,  they  were  examining  a modern  sticky-price  model,  the 
answer  is no.  In  this model,  the  anticipated  policy  path  after  the  shock 
affects  by  how  much  adjusting  firms  change  their  prices,  which  in  turn 
affects  by  how  much  output  falls.  Each  of  the  responses  of  the  policy 
variable  on  the  right  side  of  the  figure  would  lead  to a different  response 
of  output,  so  only  one  (if  any)  could  be  consistent  with  the  output  re 
sponse  in  the  left  side.  In modern  models  of  nominal  rigidities,  policy 
rules matter,  and  the  response  of  policy  variables  to policy  shocks  pro 
vides  information  on  these  policy  rules. 
In  the  study  of  fiscal  policy,  anticipated  policy  matters  even  more. 
Most  fiscal  policy  changes  are  announced  a few  quarters  in advance  and 
they  tend  to  persist,  so  fiscal  policy  is  quite  predictable.  Moreover, 
changes  in government  spending  typically  come  with  future  changes  in 
fiscal  policy  to balance  the budget  (and  intense  debates  on  the best  way 
to do  it). And  last,  in  models  with  intertemporal  substitution,  future  fis 
cal  policy  affects  relative  trade-offs  and  therefore  behavior  in  the  pres 
ent. 
2  A  Neoclassical  Model  of  Fiscal  Policy 
Consider  a  simple  neoclassical  model  of  fiscal  policy  and  the  economy. 
Households  maximize: 230  Reis 
s.t.:  (1 +  Tf )C, +  Kt+1 
= 
Rt+1Kt + WtNt  +  T? 
where  Ct  is  consumption  and  if  a  consumption  tax, Nt  hours  worked 
and  Wt  their  after-tax  wage,  Kt  the  capital  stock  and  Rt  the  after-tax  re 
turn  on  renting  it, and  Tt are  lump-sum  transfers  from  the  government. 
Firms  produce  private  output  to  maximize  profits: 
NX  { 
'  ' 
1-Tf  1-Tf  J 
where  t^  is  the  tax  rate  on  labor  and  if  the  tax  rate  on  capital  (with  no 
depreciation  exemption).  Finally,  the  economy's  resource  constraint  and 











Total  government  spending  is Gt  and  a  fraction  a  of  it  is used  in  the 
public  sector  to generate  output,  while  the  remaining  1 -  a  is  wasted  or 
provides  welfare  through  some  additive  extra  term  in  the  utility  func 
tion.2 The  government  chooses  (Gt,  if,  t^  , jf),  and  Tt ensures  a balanced 
budget  every  period. 
This  model  has  a steady  state where  all variables  are  constant.  It is de 
scribed  by  four  nonlinear  equations  relating  the  four  endogenous  vari 
ables  that  Perotti  wants  to  focus  on,  (Y,  N,  C, W),  to  the  four  policy  vari 
ables,  (G, tc,  tn,  tx).  My  only  assumption  on  the  parameters  is  that  the 
steady-state  endogenous  variables  are  positive.  Evaluating  the  Jacobian 
determinant  of  this  system  at  the  point  where  all  policy  variables  are 
zero.3 
Proposition  1: There  is  (locally)  a one-to-one  relation  between  (Y,  N,  C, W) 
and  (G,  tc,  tn,  tk). 
Therefore,  given  an  appropriate  choice  of  fiscal  policy,  the  neoclassi 
cal model  can  generate  any  steady  state  that  you  want.  This  result  is not 
surprising:  observations  of  average  output,  hours,  consumption,  and 
wages  (properly  scaled  with  growth)  convey  no  information  on  the  va 
lidity  of  the neoclassical  model. Comment  231 
To  study  the predicted  response  to government  spending  shocks,  one 
must  specify  the  dynamics  of  the  shocks  and  the  fiscal  policy  rules.  I as 
sume  the  shock  follows  an AR(1),  at 
= 
pat^ +  er  Letting  small  letters  de 
note  the  log  of  the  respective  capital  letter  relative  to  its  steady  state,  the 
fiscal  policy  rules  are: 
gt 
= 
7%  +  (1 +  \G)at, 
if 
= 
y%  +  \cgt, 
tn  = 
^  +  XNgt/ 
Tf 
= 
yKct +  \Kgr 
Total  government  spending  responds  to a  1 percent  fiscal  shock  by  (1 + 
XG)  percent,  and  it  is cyclical,  adjusting  to  the  level  of  consumption.  Tax 
rates  are  also  cyclical  and  respond  to  movements  in government  spend 
ing.  These  fiscal  policy  rules  may  not  be  optimal  or  realistic  for  devel 
oped  economies,  but  they  are  plausible  and  roughly  capture  the  cycli 
cality  of  fiscal  policy  and  the  interaction  between  taxes  and  spending.4 
There  are  eight  policy-rule  parameters:  tt = 
(yG, yc,  yN, yK, XG,  Xc, \N,  \K). 
The  log-linear  approximate  solution  of  the  model  implies  an 







^(tt)?,  +  v^ir)^ 
where  xt  is either  yt,nt,ct,  or wr  The  autoregressive  coefficients  are  com 
mon  to  all  variables,  so  differences  in dynamics  depend  on  the  eight 
moving-average  coefficients  <\>(tt) 
= 
(\Ly,  vy,  \Ln,  vn,  |ulc, vc,  \lw,  vj,  which 
are  functions  of  the policy  parameters. 
The  neoclassical  model's  predictions  for  the  variables  for  interest  are 
fully  described  by  <\>(tt). If Perotti's  estimates  fit  this ARMA(2,1)  struc 
ture,  then  he  has  effectively  estimated  <j).  Asking  if  the  neoclassical 
model  fits  the  data  then  amounts  to  asking  whether  <J>  is  close  to ^(tt). 
Roberto  finds  that  flc  >  0  and  fxw  >  0  and  argues  that  the  neoclassical 
model  predicts  the  opposite  signs,  so he  concludes  against  it.  However, 
in  the neighborhood  of  the point  where  all  the  elements  of  tt of  zero,  and 
for  conventional  parameter  values:5 
Proposition  2: There  is (locally)  a one-to-one  relation  between  it  and  ^>(tt). 
That  is, whatever  Perotti's  estimated  impulse  responses  of  output,  hours, 
consumption,  and wages,  they  are  consistent  with  a neoclassical  model 232  Reis 
with  an  appropriate  choice  of  policy  rules.  Perotti's  conclusion  comes 
from  arbitrarily  assuming  that  all  the  elements  of  tt are  zero.  But,  with 
freedom  to pick  the  policy-rule  parameters  in  it,  the  result  on  steady 
states  applies  also  to  the model's  dynamics.  No  set  of  impulse  responses 
could  ever  reject  the model. 
It is  important  to not  overstate  this  result.  This  is not  a claim  that  any 
thing  goes  in  the neoclassical  model,  nor  is  it necessarily  specific  to  the 
neoclassical  versus  other  dynamic  models.  The  point  is  instead  that 
looking  only  at  a  few  impulse  responses  and  having  a  lot of  freedom  to 
pick  policy  rules  gives  so much  freedom  that  it  leads  to no  predictions. 
This  problem  is familiar  to empirical  VARs,  but  here  is turned  on  its head 
to apply  to  theoretical  models:  identification. 
3  Identification  in  the Neoclassical  Model 
In principle,  identification  in  a  theoretical  model  can  follow  the  same 
strategies  used  in empirical  estimation.  For  instance,  it is popular  in  the 
literature  on  VARs  to  impose  timing  restrictions.  These  have  a  direct 
counterpart  in  the model.  To  see how  they work,  note  that  the neoclassi 
cal model  has  two  static  optimality  conditions,  one  from  the household's 
intra  temporal  allocation  of  labor  and  consumption,  and  the  other  from 
labor  demand  by  firms: 
kN?C? 
= 




Now,  imagine  imposing  the  restrictions  that  the  tax  rates  on  consump 
tion  and  labor  income  adjust  only  with  a one-quarter  delay  to  changes 
in  spending.  Then,  these  two  conditions  will  pin  down  the  impact  re 
sponse  of  two  of  (Yt,  Nt,  Ct, Wt)  as  a  function  of  the  other  two,  indepen 
dently  of  the  policy-rule  parameters.  Proposition  2 will  no  longer  hold, 
and  the model  has  testable  predictions  on  the  impact  response  to spend 
ing  shocks. 
Another  approach  is  to use  institutional  restrictions,  using  the  details 
of  how  taxes  are  set  in a  country  to  learn  about  some  of  the  policy-rule 
parameters  directly  (Blanchard  and  Perotti  2002).  In principle,  one  could 
impose  exactly  the  same  identifying  restrictions  on  both  the VAR  and 
the  model,  solving  both  the  empirical  and  theoretical  identification 
problems  in a  coherent  way. 
I  would  like  to propose  a  third  approach  to  identification  that uses  the Comment  233 
impulse  responses  of  policy  variables  to policy  shocks.  These  responses 
trace  out  the policy  dynamics.  The  researcher  can  use  them  to pin  down 
the  policy-rule  parameters,  tying  his  or her  hands  before  looking  at  the 
impulse  responses  of  the nonpolicy  variables.  In  this model,  this would 
amount  to using  the  estimated  impulse  responses  of  (gt, ic,  t*  ,  rf)  to pin 
down  the  policy-rule  parameters.  The  resulting  it  can  then  be  fed  into 
^(tt)  and  compared  with  the  empirical  estimates  (j>. 
This  strategy  accomplishes  the  coherence  in  identification  between 
estimates  and  model,  because  the  estimated  impulse  responses  of  the 
policy  variables  respect  the  empirical  identifying  assumptions  by  con 
struction.  When  it  is hard  to map  the  empirical  identifying  restrictions 
to  their  theoretical  counterparts,  this  procedure  accomplishes  it directly. 
Moreover,  when  the  empirical  identifying  restrictions  are  not  sufficient 
to  identify  the model,  the  policy-variables  impulse  responses  include 
new  information  from  the  data  to achieve  identification. 
To  see  this  approach  in  action,  I pursue  an  example  using  Perotti's 
baseline  SVAR  estimates  with  U.S.  data  from  1947.  Because  there  are 
only  two  policy  variables  in his  baseline  VAR?government  spending 
and  an  income  tax?I  consider  a  simpler  version  of  the  above  neoclassi 
cal model  where  there  is only  an  income  tax  (so  if 





and  consider  only  the  impulse  responses  of  output  and  consumption.  I 
solve  the model  for  the  theoretical  impulse  responses  of gt  and  it, which 
follow  the ARMA(2,1)  structure  above  with  four moving-average  pa 
rameters.  I  pin  down  the  four  policy-rule  parameters  to  match  as  closely 
as possible  the  first  16 elements  of  the  empirical  impulse  responses  of gt 
and  Tr Figure  3C1.2  shows  the  reasonably  good  match. 
Using  these  policy-rule  parameters,  I  then  solve  for  the  theoretical 
impulse  responses  of yt and  ct and  compare  them  to  their  empirical  coun 
terparts  in  figure  3C1.3.  There  are  three  results  to note.  First,  after  an  ex 
pansion  in spending,  consumption  rises  on  impact.  Contrary  to Perotti's 
claim,  rising  consumption  is consistent  with  the neoclassical  model.  The 
reason  is that  in Perotti's  estimates  in figure  3C1.2,  when  spending  rises, 
taxes  rise  and  are  expected  to  fall  in  the  future.  Households  therefore  re 
alize  it  is  relatively  less  rewarding  to work  today  rather  than  in  the  fu 
ture  and  so  cut  hours.  Since  consumption  and  leisure  are  complements, 
this  pushes  consumption  up. 
The  second  thing  to note  is  that  output  also  falls  on  impact.  This  ex 
ample  illustrates  the  perils  of  not  taking  into  account  the  identification 
of  the model.  Perotti  contrasted  his  estimates  with  the  predictions  of 
falling  consumption  and  rising  output  coming  from  a  neoclassical 234  Reis 
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Figure  3C1.2 
Impulse  responses  of  taxes  and  government  spending 
model  where  all  the  policy-rule  parameters  are  equal  to  zero.  In  fact, 
given  the  policy  rules  for  government  spending  and  income  taxes  that 
he  estimated,  the neoclassical  model  predicts  the opposite?a  fall  in out 
put  and  a  rise  in consumption  on  impact. 
The  third  result  is that  the neoclassical  model  is at odds  with  the  facts. 
While  consumption  rises  on  impact  in both  data  and  theory,  it stays  pos 
itive  in  the  former  but  falls  to negative  in  the  latter. And  the  output  re 
sponse  is positive  in  the  data  but  negative  in  the  theory  at  all  horizons. 
In general,  the  theory  predictions  are  quite  far  from  the  empirical  confi 
dence  bands. 
4  Conclusion 
Perotti  has  performed  a  tour  de  force  on  the  difficult  and  important  is 
sue  of  estimating  and  identifying  empirical  impulse  responses  to gov 
ernment  spending  shocks.  He  used  these  estimates,  in part,  to  test mod 
els,  and  this  comment  focuses  on  this  application. 
1  have  tried  to  make  two  points  that  apply  more  generally  than  to his Comment  235 
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Figure  3C1.3 
Impulse  responses  of  income  and  consumption 
paper.  The  first  is  well  known:  policy  rules  and  anticipated  policy  mat 
ter  for  the dynamics  of  intertemporal  models.  The  second  is perhaps  less 
appreciated:  theoretical  models  can  suffer  from  identification  problems 
that  are  as  serious  as  those  in empirical  estimates.  The  theorist  has many 
degrees  of  freedom  in building  his  or  her  model,  and  some  of  the most 
important  are  the most  difficult  to pin  down,  the policy  rules. 
To  be  constructive,  I propose  an  approach  to  identify  the  theoretical 
model.  It uses  the  empirical  impulse  responses  of  the policy  variables  to 
the policy  shocks  as  a  summary  of  both  the  data  and  the VAR's  identifi 
cation  conditions  to  identify  the policy  rules  in  the model.  Then,  it com 
pares  the  theoretical  impulse  responses  for  the nonpolicy  variables  with 
their  empirical  counterparts.6  When  I applied  this method  to  compare 
Perotti's  empirical  estimates  with  those  of  a neoclassical  model,  I agreed 
with  him  that  they  seem  inconsistent,  but  for very  different  reasons. 
The  typical  debate  on  structural  VARs  focuses  on  how  one  can  use  in 
formation  from models  to help  estimate  and  identify  VARs.  But,  some 
times,  the  reverse  can  also  be  true:  one  can  use  information  from  VARs 
to help  formulate  and  identify  models. 236  Reis 
Endnotes 
1.  In  the Macro  Annual  conference  alone,  see  Gali  and  Rabanal  (2005),  McGrattan  (2005), 
Christiano,  Eichenbaum,  and  Vigfussonl  (2007),  and  Kehoe  (2007). 
2.  For  simplicity,  this  assumes  that  the  public  sector's  output  is a perfect  substitute  with 
the  private  sector's  output,  so  there  is only  one  consumption  good. 
3.  All  results  are  proven  in  an  appendix  available  at my  web  site:  http://www.princeton 
.edu/~rreis. 
4.  For  a  careful  empirical  study  of  this  interaction,  see  Romer  and  Romer  (2007). 
5.  The  parameter  values  are  (3 
= 
0.99,  6 = 
1,  \\i 
= 
4,  a  = 
0.34,5 
= 
0.025,  vG/Y 
= 
0.12,  G/Y 
= 
0.21,  tk  = 
0.54,  and  p 
=  0.8.  See  the  appendix  for  explanations. 
6.  Aside  from  the well-established  practice  of  picking  model  parameters  to  fit estimated  im 
pulse  responses  (e.g.,  Christiano,  Eichenbaum,  and  Evans  2005),  there  are  two  closer  an 
tecedents  to  this  approach.  Both  also  abide  by  the  general  principle  that  the  policymaker's 
policy-rule  parameters  in  the model  are  chosen  to match  the  empirical  impulse  response 
function  of  the policy  variables,  but  they  impose  stricter  restrictions  on  the policy  rules.  Edel 
berg,  Eichenbaum,  and  Fisher  (1999)  and  Burnside,  Eichenbaum,  and  Fisher  (2004)  assume 
the  policy  rules  for  government  spending  and  taxes  are  a  moving  average  of  the  exogenous 
fiscal  shocks,  without  any  feedback  from  endogenous  variables,  and  pick  the  moving 
average  parameters  to  match  their VAR  empirical  estimates.  Rotemberg  and Woodford  (1996) 
make  timing  assumptions  on monetary  policy  that  ensure  that  the policy  rule  parameters  can 
be  identified  from  the VAR  estimates  without  having  to  specify  the  rest  of  the model. 
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